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Abstract 
Evidence for the United States suggests balanced growth despite falling investment-good prices and less 
than unitary elasticity of substitution between capital and labor. This is inconsistent with the Uzawa 
Growth Theorem. We extend Uzawa’s theorem to show that introducing human capital accumulation in 
the standard way does not resolve the puzzle. However, balanced growth is possible if education is 
endogenous and capital is more complementary with schooling than with raw labor. We describe 
balanced growth paths for several neoclassical growth models with capital-augmenting technological 
progress and endogenous schooling. The balanced growth path in an overlapping-generations model in 
which individuals choose their time in school matches key features of the U.S. record. 
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1 Introduction
Some key facts about economic growth have become common lore. Among those famously cited by
Kaldor (1961) are the observation that output per worker and capital per worker have grown steadily,
while the capital-output ratio, the real return on capital, and the shares of capital and labor in national
income have remained fairly constant. Jones (2015) updates these facts using the latest available data.
He reports that real per capita GDP in the United States has grown at a remarkably steady average
rate of around two percent per yearfor a period of nearly 150 years, while the ratio of physical capital
to output has remained nearly constant. The shares of capital and labor in total factor payments were
very stable from 1945 through about 2000.1
These facts suggest to many the relevance of a balanced growth pathand thus the need for models
that predict sustained growth of output, consumption and capital at constant rates. Indeed, neoclassical
growth theory was developed largely with this goal in mind. Apparently, it succeeded. As Jones and
Romer (2010, p.225) conclude: There is no longer any interesting debate about the features that a model
must contain to explain [the Kaldor facts]. These features are embedded in one of the great successes of
growth theory in the 1950s and 1960s, the neoclassical growth model.
Alas, all is not well,as Hamlet might say. Jones (2015) highlights yet another fact that was noted
earlier by Gordon (1990), Greenwood et al. (1997), Cummins and Violante (2002), and others: the
relative price of capital equipment, adjusted for quality, has been falling steadily and dramatically since
at least 1960. Figure 1 reproduces two series from FRED (Federal Reserve Economic Data, a database
maintained by the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis).2 In the period from 1947 to 2013, the relative
price of investment goods has fallen at a compounded average rate of 2.0 percent per annum. The relative
price of equipment has fallen at an even faster annual rate of 3.8 percent.
This observation of falling capital prices rests uncomfortably with the features of the economy that are
thought to be needed to foster balanced growth. As Uzawa (1961) pointed out, and Schlicht (2006) and
Jones and Scrimgeour (2008) later claried, a balanced growth path in the two-factor neoclassical growth
model with a constant and exogenous rate of population growth and a constant rate of labor-augmenting
technological progress requires either an aggregate production function with a unitary elasticity of sub-
1As is well known from Piketty (2014) and many others before him and since, the share of capital in national income has
been rising, and that of labor falling, since around 2000; see, for example, Elsby et al. (2013), Karabarbounis and Neiman
(2014), and Lawrence (2015). It is not clear yet whether this is a temporary uctuation around the longstanding division,
part of a transition to a new steady-state division, or perhaps (as Piketty asserts) a permanent departure from stable factor
shares.
2The FRED data for investment and equipment prices are based on updates of Gordons (1990) numbers by Cummins
and Violante (1990) and DiCecio (2009, Appendix A).
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Figure 1: U.S. Relative Price of Equipment, 1947-2013
Source: Federal Reserve Bank Economic Data (FRED), Series PIRIC and PERIC.
stitution between capital and labor or else an absence of any capital-augmenting technological progress.
The size of the elasticity of substitution between capital and labor is much debated and still controver-
sial. Yet, a preponderance of the evidence suggests an elasticity well below one.3 And the fact that the
quality-adjusted prices of investment goods (and especially equipment) have been falling relative to the
price of nal output suggests that the rate of (embodied) capital-augmenting technological progress has
not been nil.4
The Uzawa Growth Theorem rests on the impossibility of getting an endogenous rate of capital
accumulation to line up with an exogenous growth rate of e¤ective labor in the presence of capital-
augmenting technological progress, unless the aggregate production function takes a Cobb-Douglas form.
The problem, it would seem, stems from the models assumption of an inelastic supply of e¤ective
labor that does not adjust to capital deepening, even over time. If human capital could be accumulated
endogenously, via investments in schooling, on-the-job training, or otherwise, then perhaps e¤ective labor
growth would fall into line with growth in e¤ective capital, and a balanced growth path would be possible
in a broader set of circumstances. Seen in this light, another fact about the U.S. growth experience
appears to o¤er a way out. We reproduce as did Jones (2015) a gure from Goldin and Katz (2007).
3Chirinko (2008, p.671), for example, who surveyed and evaluated a large number of studies that attempted to measure
this elasticity, concluded that the weight of the evidence suggests a value of [the elasticity of substitution] in the range of
0.4 to 0.6.In research conducted since that survey, Karabarounis and Nieman (2014) estimate an elasticity of substitution
greater than one, but Chirinko et al. (2011), Obereld and Raval (2014), Chirinko and Mallick (2014), Herrendorf, et al.
(2015), and Lawrence (2015) all estimate elasticities below one.
4Motivated by Uzawas Growth Theorem, Acemo¼glu (2003) and Jones (2005) provide theories of directed technical change
in order to provide an explanation for the absence of capital-augmenting technical change. To be consistent with balanced
growth, both look for restrictions that would lead endogenous technical change to be entirely labor-augmenting. Neither
attempts to reconcile capital-augmenting technical change with balanced growth.
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Figure 2: U.S. Education by Birth Cohort, 1876-1982
Source: Goldin and Katz (2007) and additional data from Lawrence Katz.
Figure 2 shows the average years of schooling measured at age thirty for all cohorts of native American
workers born between 1876 and 1982.5 Clearly, educational attainment has been rising steadily for more
than a century. Put di¤erently, there has been ongoing investment in human capital. Indeed, Uzawa
(1965), Lucas (1988), and others have established the existence of a balanced growth path in a neoclassical
growth model that incorporates a standard treatment of human capital accumulation, albeit in settings
that lack embodied or disembodied capital-augmenting technological progress.6
Unfortunately, the usual formulation of human capital does not do the trick. In the next section, we
prove an extended version of the Uzawa Growth theorem that allows for accumulation of human capital.
We specify an aggregate production function that has e¤ective capital (the product of physical capital
and a productivity-augmenting technology term) and human capital as arguments. Human capital is
represented as an arbitrary function of technology-augmented raw laborand a variable that measures
private investments in upgrading the labor input. In this setting, we show again that balanced growth
requires either a unitary elasticity of substitution between physical capital and human capital, or else
an absence of capital-augmenting technological progress. The intuition is similar to that provided by
Jones and Scrimgeour for the original Uzawa theorem. Along a balanced growth path, physical capital
that is produced from nal goods inherits the trend in output growth.7 But the growth rate of nal
5We are grateful to Larry Katz for providing the unpublished data that allowed us to extend his earlier gure.
6Uzawa (1965) studies a model with endogenous accumulation of human capital in which education augments e¤ective
labor supply so as to generate convergence to a steady state. Lucas (1988) incorporates an externality in his measure of
human capital, a possibility that we do not consider here. Acemo¼glu (2009, pp. 371-374) characterizes a balanced growth
path in a setting with overlapping generations.
7 If the price of investment goods relative to consumption can change something Jones and Scrimgeour did not consider
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output is a weighted average of the growth rates of e¤ective capital and e¤ective labor, with factor shares
as weights. If these shares are to remain constant along a balanced growth path with an aggregate
production function that is not Cobb-Douglas, then e¤ective capital and e¤ective labor must grow at
common rates. It follows that the growth rate of output also mirrors the growth rate of e¤ective capital.
With the growth rate of nal output equal to both the growth rate of (the value of) physical capital
and the growth rate of e¤ective capital, there is no room for capital productivity to improve or for the
cost of investment to fall. And all of this is true whether e¤ective labor grows partly due to endogenous
investment in human capital or not.
But our ndings in Section 2 also point to a way out of the bind. Ongoing increases in educational
attainment such as those depicted in Figure 2 can potentially reconcile the existence of a balanced growth
path with a sustained rise in capital or investment productivity and an elasticity of substitution between
capital and labor less than unity, provided that schooling enters the aggregate production function dif-
ferently than raw labor. Then investments in schooling can o¤set the change in the capital share that
results from capital deepening (growth in e¤ective capital relative to technology-augmented raw labor).
It is possible with just the right steady gains in education for balanced growth to occur, with out-
put and the value of capital growing at the same rates, e¤ective capital growing at a faster rate than
technology-augmented labor, and an index of schooling rising over time to keep the factor shares constant.
To be more precise, suppose that F (K;L; s; t) is the output that can be produced with the technology
available at time t by L units of raw laborworking with K units of physical capital, when the economy
has an education level summarized by the scalar measure s. Suppose that F () has constant returns to
scale in K and L and that KL < 1, where KL  FLFK=FFLK is the elasticity of substitution between
capital and labor, holding schooling constant. We will show that a balanced growth path with constant
factor shares, a growing index of education level, and positive capital-augmenting technological progress
(embodied or disembodied) can emerge, but only if the ratio of the marginal product of schooling to the
marginal product of labor rises as capital accumulates; i.e., @ (Fs=FL) =@K > 0. Clearly, this precludes
a production function of the form F (K;H; t), where H = G (L; s; t) is a standard measure of human
capital at time t, because then Fs=FL is independent of K. A necessary condition for balanced growth in
the presence of capital-augmenting technological progress and a non-unitary elasticity of substitution is
a su¢ cient degree of complementarity between capital and education. Of course, many researchers have
noted the empirical relevance of capital-skill complementarity (see, most prominently, Krusell, et al.,
the analogous requirement is that the value of the capital stock inherits the growth rate of output.
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2000 and Autor, et al., 1998), albeit with varying interpretations of the word skill and of the word
complementarity.Our analysis makes clear that the appropriate sense of complementarity is a relative
one: growth in the capital stock must raise the marginal productivity of schooling relatively more than
it does the marginal productivity of raw labor. Moreover, if KL < 1, then balanced growth requires
that the technology F (K;L; s; t) be characterized by strict log supermodularity in K and s, which is a
stronger sense of complementarity than FKs > 0.
The fact that schooling gains can o¤set the e¤ects of capital-augmenting technological progress on the
capital share does not of course mean that they will do so in a reasonable model of schooling decisions.
So we proceed in the subsequent sections to introduce optimizing behavior. In Section 3, we keep things
simple at the cost of realism. We rst solve a social planners resource-allocation problem that incorporates
a reduced-form specication of the trade-o¤ between an index of an economys schooling level and its
available labor supply. The key simplifying assumptions in this section are that an economys schooling
can be represented by a scalar measure and that this choice variable can jump from one moment to the
next. Under these assumptions, when the aggregate production function belongs to a specied class, the
optimal growth trajectory converges to a balanced-growth path with constant rates of growth of output,
consumption and capital, and a constant capital share in national income. Following the presentation
of the planners problem, we present two distinct models in which the market equilibrium shares the
dynamic properties of the e¢ cient solution. In both models, the economy is populated by a continuum
of similar dynasties, each comprising a sequence of family members who survive for only innitessimal
lifespans. In the time-in-school model of Section 3.2, each individual decides what fraction of her
brief existence to devote to schooling, thereby determining her productivity in her remaining time as
a worker. Firms allocate capital to their various employees as a function of their productivity levels
and therefore their schooling. In the manager-workermodel of Section 3.3, individuals instead make
a discrete educational choice. Those who devote a xed fraction of their life to schooling are trained
to work as managers with their remaining time. Those who do not opt for management training have
their full life to serve as production workers. In this case, our measure of the economys education is its
ratio of manager hours to worker hours, and we assume that productivity of a production unit (workers
combined with equipment) rises with this ratio due to improved monitoring. In both models the economy
converges to a balanced-growth path for a specied class of production functions, all of whose members
are characterized by stronger complementarity between capital and schooling than between capital and
technology-augmented labor.
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Section 4 adds features to the time-in-school model that make it more realistic. There, we allow the
dynasties to comprise overlapping generations of nitely-lived family members. Each individual devotes
the rst part of her life to school and chooses a stopping date to enter the workforce so as to maximize the
dynastys utility. Once an individual begins working, productivity initially rises and ultimately falls with
experience. Death happens stochastically according to a Poisson process. If the individual survives a
su¢ ciently long career, eventually her productivity falls to zero and she retires.In this setting, di¤erent
birth cohorts make di¤erent education decisions, and so schoolingdoes not have a scalar representation.
Both an individuals education attainment and the distribution of education levels in the workforce are
state variables that adjust gradually over time.
For a range of parameter values, the overlapping-generations model like its counterpart with non-
overlapping generations admits a balanced-growth path for a class of production functions that has
KL < 1; even with ongoing capital-augmenting technological progress. On the balanced-growth path,
the value of capital grows at the same rate as the value of output, the productivity-augmented capital stock
grows faster than technology-augmented labor, educational attainment by birth cohort rises linearly with
time, labor-force participation trends downward, and both aggregate factor shares and the real interest
rate are constant. The growth rate of per capita output is increasing in the rate of labor-augmenting
technological progress and the rate of capital-augmenting technological progress. Although we have no
analytical result for the long-run e¤ects of an acceleration or deceleration of technical change on income
distribution, plausible parameter values selected to approximate those in the U.S. economy suggest that
a slowdown in either form of technological progress will raise the capital share in national income.
Section 5 contains some concluding remarks.
2 The Extended Uzawa Growth Theorem and a Possible Way Out
In this section, we state and prove a version of the Uzawa Growth Theorem, following Schlicht (2006) and
Jones and Scrimgeour (2008), and extend it to allow for falling investment-good prices and the possible
accumulation of human capital. We also show how investments in schooling can loosen the straitjacket
of the theorem, but only if capital accumulation boosts the marginal product of schooling proportionally
more than it does the marginal product of raw labor.
Let Yt = F (AtKt; BtLt; st) be a standard neoclassical production function with constant returns to
scale in its rst two arguments, where, as usual, Yt is output, Kt is capital, Lt is labor, and where At
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and Bt characterize the state of (disembodied) technology at time t, augmenting respectively the physical
capital stock and the raw labor force.8 We take st to be a scalar variable representing the education
level in the economy.
At time t, the economy can convert one unit of output into qt units of capital. Growth in qt represents
what Greenwood et al. (1997) have called investment-specic technological change.This is a form of
embodied technical change familiar from the earlier work of Johansen (1959), Solow (1960) and others
inasmuch as new capital goods require less foregone consumption than did prior vintages of capital. The
economys resource constraint can be written as
Yt = Ct + It=qt ,
where Ct is consumption and It is the number of newly-installed units of capital. Investment in new
capital augments the capital stock after the replacement of depreciation, which occurs at a xed rate ;
i.e.,
_Kt = It   Kt.
We begin with a lemma that extends slightly the one proved by Jones and Scrimgeour (2008) by
incorporating ongoing investment-specic technological progress. Dene a balanced-growth path (BGP)
as a trajectory along which the economy experiences constant proportional rates of growth of Yt; Ct, and
Kt after some time T . Let gX = _Xt=Xt denote the growth rate of the variable X along the BGP. We
have
Lemma 1 Suppose gq is constant. Then in any BGP with Ct < Yt, gY = gC = gK   gq.
The proof, which closely follows Jones and Scrimgeour, is relegated to the appendix. The lemma states
that the growth rates of consumption and the capital stock mirror that of total output. However, with
the possibility of investment-specic technological progress, it is the value of the capital stock measured
in units of the nal good (and the resources used in investment) that grows at the same rate as output.9
Now dene K  gA + gq. This can be viewed as the total rate of capital-augmenting technological
change, combining the rate of disembodied progress (gA) and the rate of embodied progress (gq). Also,
8For ease of exposition and for comparability with the literature, we treat technology as a combination of components that
augment physical capital and raw labor. However, as we show in the appendix, our Proposition 1 can readily be extended
to any constant-returns to scale production function with the form F (Kt; Lt; st; t).
9When capital goods are valued, their price pt in terms of nal goods must equal the cost of new investment, i.e., pt = 1=qt.
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dene, as we did before, KL  (FLFK) = (FLKF ) to be the elasticity of substitution between capital and
labor holding xed the level of schooling. In the appendix we prove
Proposition 1 Suppose that investment-specic technological progress occurs at constant rate gq. If there
exists a BGP along which the income shares of capital and labor are constant and strictly positive when
factors are paid their marginal products, then
(1  KL) K = KL
FL
FK
@ (Fs=FL)
@K
_s . (1)
The proposition stipulates a relationship between the combined rate of capital-augmenting technological
progress and the change in schooling per worker that is needed to keep factor shares constant as the value
of the capital stock and output grow at common rates.
We can now revisit the two cases that are familiar from the literature. First, suppose that there are
no opportunities for investment in schooling, so that s remains constant. This is the setting considered
by Uzawa (1961). Setting _s = 0 in (1) yields
Corollary 1 (Uzawa) Suppose that s is constant. Then a BGP with constant and strictly positive factor
shares can exist only if KL = 1 or K = 0.
As is well known, balanced growth in a neoclassical economy without education requires either a Cobb-
Douglas production function or an absence of capital-augmenting technological progress.10
Second, suppose that (e¤ective) labor and schooling can be aggregated into an index of human
capital,H (BL; s), such that net output can be written as a function of e¤ective physical capital and
human capital, as in Uzawa (1965), Lucas (1988), or Acemo¼glu (2009). Denote this production function
by ~F [AK;H (BL; s)]  F (AK;BL; s). Then Fs=FL = Hs=HL, which is independent of K. Setting
@ (Fs=FL) =@K = 0 in (1) yields
Corollary 2 (Human Capital) Suppose that there exists a measure of human capital, H (BL; s), such
that F (AK;BL; s)  ~F [AK;H (BL; s)]. Then a BGP with constant and strictly positive factor shares
can exist only if KL = 1 or K = 0.
10Our Proposition 1 is predicated on constant and interior factor shares. But, in the Uzawa case, log di¤erentiation of the
production function with to respect to time, holding s constant, implies
gY = K (gA + gK) + (1  K) (gB + n)
where K = AKFK=Y is the capital share in national income. In a steady state in which Y and K grow at constant rates
in response to constant rates of growth of A;B;L and q, K must be constant as well. Note that Jones and Scrimgeour do
not assume constant factor shares in their statement and proof of the Uzawa Growth Theorem.
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In this case, ongoing accumulation of human capital cannot perpetually neutralize the e¤ects of capital
deepening on the factor shares.
However, Proposition 1 suggests that balanced growth with constant factor shares might be possible
despite a non-unitary elasticity of substitution between capital and labor and the presence of capital-
augmenting technological progress, so long as _s 6= 0 and @ (Fs=FL) =@K 6= 0. Suppose, for example,
that KL < 1, as seems most consistent with the empirical literature. Suppose further that educational
attainment grows over time, again in line with observation. Then the existence of a BGP with constant
factor shares requires @ (Fs=FL) =@K > 0; i.e., an increase in the capital stock must raise the marginal
product of schooling by proportionally more than it does the marginal product of raw labor. In looser
parlance, the technology must be characterized by capital-skill complementarity,or by a skill biasin
the capital-augmenting technological change.
The results in this section use only resource constraints (i.e., accounting) and the assumption that
factors are paid their marginal products. We have, as yet, provided no model of savings, of investment,
or of schooling decisions. Moreover, we have shown that a BGP with constant factor shares might exist,
but not that one does exist under some reasonable set of assumptions about individual behavior and a
reasonable specication of the aggregate production function. These are our next tasks, which we will
perform in two stages. First, we study a simple environment in which the economys level of education
can be summarized by a scalar variable that can jump discretely from one moment to the next. Then,
we extend our analysis to a more realistic setting in which individualseducation accumulates slowly over
time and the distribution of educational levels in the economy evolves gradually.
3 Balanced Growth with Short Lifespans
We begin this section by posing a social planners problem that incorporates a reduced-form treatment
of schooling choice. In Section 3.1, the planner designs a time path for a scalar variable that summarizes
the level of education in the workforce. The planner faces a trade-o¤ between the level of schooling and
the labor supply available for producing output. The economy experiences both labor-augmenting and
capital-augmenting technological progress, and the elasticity of substitution between capital and labor in
aggregate production is less than one. Here we show that the planners allocation converges to a unique
BGP for a specied class of production functions and under certain parameter restrictions. Moreover,
if the e¢ cient allocation can be characterized by balanced growth after some moment in time, then the
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technology must have a representation with a production function in the specied class. We derive the
steady-state growth rate of output for the planners solution and the associated (and constant) capital
share in income.
In the succeeding subsections, we develop a pair of models of individual behavior and aggregate
production that generate the reduced-form education function of Section 3.1. Both models feature a
continuum of dynasties and a sequence of family members that survive only for eetingly brief lives.
Generations are replaced continuously by new ones that begin afresh, without prior schooling. In Sec-
tion 3.2, the representative family member decides the fraction of her life to devote to school, thereby
determining as well her availability for gainful employment. Workers produce with the capital allocated
to them by competitive rms and their productivity on the job depends on their educational attainment.
In Section 3.3, by contrast, individuals face a discrete choice between pursuing an education that leaves
them skilledor having more time for work. Those who attend school ultimately are employed by rms
as managers,while those who remain unskilled serve as production workers.The productivity of a
production unit varies with the ratio of managers to workers, i.e., the inverse of the managersspan of
control. In Section 3.4, we describe how the model can be extended to include directed technical change,
in the manner introduced by Acemoglu (2003). We conclude the section with a brief discussion that
relates our ndings to the recent literature on investment-specic technological progress.
3.1 A Planners Problem with a Reduced-Form Education Function
The economy comprises a continuum of identical family dynasties of measure one. Each family has a
continuum Nt of members alive at time t, where Nt grows at the exogenous rate n. Dynastic utility at
some time t0 is given by
u (t0) =
Z 1
t0
Nte
 (t t0) c
1 
t   1
1   dt , (2)
where ct is consumption per family member at time t and  is the subjective discount rate.
Consider the problem facing a social planner who seeks to maximize utility for the representative
dynasty subject to a resource constraint, an evolving technology, and an ongoing trade-o¤ between some
aggregate measure of educational attainment and contemporaneous labor supply. Write this trade-o¤ in
reduced form as Lt = D (st)Nt, with D0 (st) < 0 for all st, where st is a scalar index of schooling and Lt
is labor supply. The production function takes the form Yt = F (AtKt; BtLt; st), where At again converts
physical capital to e¤ective capital in view of the disembodied technology available at time t, and
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similarly Bt converts raw labor to e¤ective labor. Assuming, as we do, that F () has constant returns to
scale in its rst two arguments, we can express this function in intensive form as f (kt; st)  F (kt; 1; st),
where f () is output per e¤ective worker and kt = AtKt=BtLt is the ratio of e¤ective capital to e¤ective
labor. The economy can convert one unit of the nal good into qt units of capital at time t. Capital
depreciates at the constant rate .
We assume that the technology can be represented by a member of a class of production functions
that take the following form.
Assumption 1 The intensive production function can be written as f (k; s) = D (s)  h [kD (s)], with
 > 0 and  2 (0; 1), where
(i) h (z) is strictly increasing, twice di¤erentiable, and strictly concave for all z  kD (s)  0; and
(ii) f(k; s) is strictly log supermodular in k and s.
Assumption 1 immediately implies that KL < 1 and that @ (Fs=FL) =@K > 0.11 Therefore, the technol-
ogy satises the pre-requisites for the existence of a BGP, per Proposition 1, provided that the planners
optimal choice of schooling is rising over time.
We also impose some parameter restrictions. Let Eh(z)  zh0 (z) =h (z) be the elasticity of the h ()
function. Note that Eh(z) is strictly decreasing under Assumption 1.12 Now dene dmax  limz!0 Eh (z)
and dmin  limz!1 Eh (z). We adopt
Assumption 2 (i)   dmax; (ii)  1 1 2 (dmin; dmax).
Part (i) of Assumption 2 ensures that the marginal product of schooling is non-negative for all levels
of k and s.13 Part (ii) guarantees that  > 1 and that the optimal schooling choice is positive, as
we will see below. To provide an example of a technology that satises Assumption 1, we can choose
h (z) = (1 + z ) = ; with  > 0, which results from a production function of the form F (AK;BL; s)
= (BL)1 
n
(AK)  +

D (s) BL
 o =
. In this case, Eh (z) = = (1 + z). Clearly, Eh (z) is
declining in z, and we have dmin = 0 and dmax = .
11See the proof in the appendix.
12To see this, note that dEh (z) =dz /   [Eh (z)  Eh0 (z)  1], where Eh0 (z)  zh00 (z) =h0 (z) is the elasticity of h0 (z). Using
f (k; s) = D (s)  h [kD (s)], D0 (s) < 0, and the fact that f (k; s) is strictly log supermodular if and only if fksf > fkfs,
it follows readily that dEh (z) =dz < 0.
13Assumption 1 implies fs (k; s) = h (z)D (s)
  1 [   Eh(z)], which is non-negative for all k and s if and only if
dmax  .
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We can write the planners problem as
max
fct;stg
Z 1
t0
Nte
 (t t0) c
1 
t   1
1   dt
subject to
Yt  BtLtD (st)  h

AtKt
BtLt
D (st)


;
Lt = D (st)Nt ;
_Kt = qt (Yt  Ntct)  Kt .
where the rst constraint describes the technology at time t in view of Assumption 1, the second captures
the trade-o¤between education and labor supply, and the last reects the resource constraint that governs
capital accumulation. The planner takes the initial capital stock, Kt0 , as given.
Substituting for Lt = D (st)Nt, we can re-write the rst constraint as
Yt  BtNtD (st) ( 1) h

AtKt
BtNt
D (st)
 1

.
Now, since the schooling variable does not appear in the maximand or in the capital-accumulation equa-
tion, it is clear that the planner should choose st at every t to maximize contemporaneous output. The
rst-order condition @Yt=@st = 0 implies
  (  1)h

AtKt
BtNt
D (st)
 1

+ (  1)h0

AtKt
BtNt
D (st)
 1

AtKt
BtNt
D (st)
 1 = 0 ,
or14
Eh [ktD (st)] =    1
  1 for all t . (3)
In other words, the planner chooses education at every moment in time so that zt  ktD (st) remains
constant. In this sense, the planner o¤sets (e¤ective) capital deepening by increases in schooling.
14Note that
AtKt
BtNt
D (st)
 1 =
AtKt
BtLt
D (st)

= ktD (st)
 .
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Let z denote the optimal (and time invariant) value of zt. Part (ii) of Assumption 2 ensures that
there exists a solution for z and the fact that Eh(z) is strictly decreasing implies that the solution is
unique.15
Once we have zt = z, we can use Assumption 1 to solve for aggregate output as a function of the
capital stock, the population size, and the state of technology. We nd
Yt = (BtNt)
(1 )
 1 (AtKt)
 1
 1 z
 1 
 1 h (z) . (4)
Notice that (4) is a Cobb-Douglas function of e¤ective capital and technology-augmented population,
with exponents   (   1) = (  1) and 1   , respectively. Now substituting for Yt in the planners
constraints yields a standard and familiar dynamic optimization problem. As usual, we need the discount
rate to be su¢ ciently large so that the integral in the maximand is bounded. In particular, we invoke
Assumption 3  > n+ (1  )
h
L +
 1
(1 )K
i
.
Assumption 3 ensures that the transversality condition for the dynamic optimization will be satised.
We will not rehearse the details of the transition path; these are familiar from neoclassical growth
theory. In the appendix, we show that the planner chooses the initial per capita consumption level, ct0 ,
so as to put the economy on the unique saddle path that converges to a steady state. On the BGP,
consumption and output grow at constant rate gY and the capital stock grows at constant rate gK .
We can readily calculate the growth rates of output and consumption along the BGP. From (3), we
have
(  1) gD + gA + gK   L   n = 0
for all t  t0. Noting that Yt = BtNtD (st) ( 1) h (z), we also have
gY = L + n  (   1) gD
along the optimal path. Finally, combining these two equations and using Lemma 1 which requires that
gY = gK gq along any BGP we nd that gD =  K= (1  ) and gY = n+L+K (   1) = (1  )
in the steady state, where K  gA + gq, as before.
15 In the appendix, we show that the second-order condition is satised at zt = z under Assumption 1. Moreover, we
show that the second-order condition would be violated if f (k; s) were not log supermodular or, equivalently in this setting,
if the elasticity of substitution between e¤ective capital and e¤ective labor exceeds one.
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The growth of per capita income is increasing in the rate of labor-augmenting technological progress,
just as in the neoclassical growth model without endogenous schooling. But now a BGP exists even when
there is ongoing capital-augmenting technological progress or when the price of investment-goods is falling
at a constant rate. Assumption 2 guarantees that  > 1.16 Therefore, the growth rate of per capita
income also is increasing in K , the combined rate of embodied and disembodied capital-augmenting
progress.
We have not as yet introduced any market decentralization, which we will do only for the specic
models described in Sections 3.2 and 3.3 below. However, in anticipation that capital will be paid its
marginal product in a competitive equilibrium, we can dene the capital share in national income at time
t as Kt = (@Yt=@Kt)Kt=Yt. Using (4), we see that Kt = (   1) = (  1)   for all t  t0. That
is, the planner chooses the trajectories for the capital stock and schooling such that the capital share
remains constant, both along the transition path and in the steady state. Notice that the growth rate
and the capital share both are increasing in  and ; in this sense, fast growth and a high capital share
go hand in hand.
For future reference, we summarize our ndings in the following proposition.
Proposition 2 Suppose there is a trade-o¤ between labor supply and a summary measure of schooling
given by Lt = D (st)Nt. Let Assumptions 1, 2, and 3 hold. Then along the optimal trajectory from any
initial capital stock, Kt0, the economy converges to a BGP. On the BGP,
(i) aggregate output and aggregate consumption grow at the common rate gY = n+ L +
 1
(1 )K ;
(ii) schooling evolves such that gD =   K(1 ) ;
(iii) the capital share is constant and equal to K =
 1
 1 .
We o¤er now some remarks about the role of Assumption 1. This assumption restricts the form of
the intensive production function. But we could as well have made an assumption directly about the
gross output function, F (AK;BL; s). Then we would have stipulated that this function takes the form
~F
h
AKD (s)a ; BLD (s) b
i
for some quasi-concave function ~F () with constant-returns to scale in the
two arguments and some a > 0 and b > 0. Written in this way, h[kD (s)] is equivalent to ~F [kD (s) ; 1],
16Assumption 1(i) implies dmin  0. So, Assumption 2 implies (   1)= (  1) > 0. Thus, if  > 1,  > 1. Suppose
 < 1 and  < 1. Then Assumption 2(i) and Assumption 2(ii) imply (  1) < (   1), which in turn implies  > 1.
This contradicts Assumption 1.
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so we would need assumptions about ~F () that are equivalent to Assumption 2(i) and (ii). Clearly, we
would have a =  (1  ) and b = .
Evidently, schooling enters the gross output function in a way that augments the productivity of
labor while diminishing the productivity of capital.17 Of course, with the analog to Assumption 2(i), the
combined e¤ect of schooling on gross output is positive. The decline in the productivity of capital is just
what is needed, along the BGP, to keep the schooling-plus-technology augmented capital stock growing
in line with output. To see that this is so, notice that D (s)aAtqt is constant along the BGP. The e¤ect of
the optimal schooling is as if to neutralize the e¤ect of the capital-augmenting progress and the declining
investment-good prices on the growth of the e¤ective capital stock.
One might wonder whether we are able to dispense with the functional-form restriction of Assumption
1. The answer to this question is no. In the appendix, we prove that if Lt = D (st)Nt and if the solution
to the social planners problem exhibits balanced growth after some time T with increasing schooling and
a constant capital share K 2 (0; 1), then either there is no capital-augmenting technological progress
(K = 0) or else the technology can be represented along the equilibrium trajectory by a production
function with the form ~F
h
AtKD (s)
a ; BtLD (s)
 b
i
, with a > 0 when K > 0 and b = 1+aK= (1  K).
In other words, Assumption 1 is not only su¢ cient for the existence of a BGP with K > 0 and KL < 1,
but it is essentially necessary as well. As with any model that generates balanced growth, knife-edge
restrictions are required to maintain the balance; our model is no exception to this rule.
3.2 Balanced Growth in a Time-in-SchoolModel
We provide now a rst example of a market economy that generates the reduced form described in Section
3.1. The competitive equilibrium of this economy mimics the planners optimal allocation, and so the
market economy converges to a BGP with the properties summarized in Proposition 2.
As above, the representative family has a continuum Nt of members at time t. Each life is eetingly
brief; an individual attends school for the rst fraction of her momentary existence and then joins the
workforce for the remainder of her life. The variable st now represents the fraction of life that the
representative member of the generation alive at time t devotes to education; she spends the remaining
fraction 1  st working. In this case, D (s) = 1  s, so that the familys labor supply is Lt = Nt (1  st).
Given the brevity of life, there is no discounting of an individuals wages relative to her time in school.
17This observation should not be misinterpreted. Under Assumption 1(ii) that f (k; s) is strictly log supermodular, it
remains true that capital is more complementary to schooling than it is to labor, in the sense that Fs=FL rises with capital
accumulation.
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But dynasties do discount the earnings (and well being) of future generations relative to those currently
alive. Every new cohort starts from scratch with no schooling.
Each individual chooses her consumption, savings, and schooling to maximize total dynastic utility,
which at time t0 is given by (2). Each individual supposes that other family members in her own and
subsequent generations will behave similarly. Savings are used to purchase units of physical capital, which
are passed on within the family from one generation to the next. The Nt members of the representative
dynasty collectively inherit Kt units of capital at time t, considering that the aggregate capital stock is
fully owned by the population and there is a unit continuum of dynasties in the economy.
Firms produce output using capital, labor, and the technology available at the time. A rm that
employs Kt units of physical capital and that hires Lt time units from workers with schooling st at
time t produces F (AtKt; BtLt; st) = ~F
h
AtKt (1  st)(1 ) ; BtLt (1  st) 
i
units of output. Then the
intensive production function takes the form f (k; s) = (1  s)  h [k (1  s)]. The functions h () and
f () have the properties described in Assumption 1. The parameter restrictions in Assumptions 2 and 3
also apply. Aggregate output is simply the sum of the outputs produced by all rms.
The competitive rms take the rental rate per unit of capital, Rt, and the wage schedule per
unit of time, Wt (st), as given, where the latter conveys the competitive wage rate for a worker with
schooling st. A rm that hires workers with this level of education chooses Lt and kt to maximize
BtLt [f (kt; st)  rtkt   wt (st)], where rt  Rt=At is the rental rate per e¤ective unit of capital and
wt (st) Wt (st) =Bt is the wage per e¤ective unit of labor. Prot maximization implies, as usual, that
fk (kt; st) = rt (5)
and18
f (kt; st)  rtkt = wt (st) . (6)
We dene the functions  (s; r) and ! (s; r) such that fk [ (s; r) ; s]  r and ! (s; r)  f [ (s; r) ; s]  
r (s; r). Then, in equilibrium, kt =  (st; rt) and wt (st) = ! (st; rt).
Schooling choices have no persistence for the family. Therefore, an individual alive at time t who
seeks to maximize dynastic utility should choose s to maximize her own wage income, Bt (1  s)! (s; rt),
taking the rental rate per unit of e¤ective capital as given. The rental rate will determine, via (5), how
18Equation (6) is the zero-prot condition, which is implied by the optimal choice of Lt in an equilibrium with positive
output.
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much capital the individual will be allocated by her employer as a reection of her schooling choice. The
individuals education decision is separable from her choice of consumption, much as the planners choice
of st in Section 3.1 was separable from the choice of ct and _Kt.
The rst-order condition for income maximization at time t requires
(1  st)!s (st; rt) = ! (st; rt) .
But using ! (s; rt)  f [ (s; rt) ; s]   rt (s; rt) and noting (5), we have !s (st; rt) = fs [ (st; rt) ; st].
In other words, the marginal e¤ect of schooling on the wage reects only the direct e¤ect of schooling
on per capita output; the extra output that comes from a greater capital allocation to more highly
educated workers, fks, just o¤sets the extra part of revenue that the rm must pay for that capital, rs.
Consequently, we can rewrite the rst-order condition as
(1  st) fs [ (st; rt) ; st] = f [ (st; rt) ; s]  fk [ (st; rt) ; st] (st; rt) . (7)
Now replace f (k; s) by (1  s)  h [k (1  s)] and use this representation to calculate fs () and
fk () as well. After rearranging terms, this yields
(   1)h [ (st; rt) (1  st)] = (  1)h0 [ (st; rt) (1  st)] (st; rt) (1  st)
or
Eh [ (st; rt) (1  st)] =    1
  1 .
Evidently, the individuals choice of schooling to maximize wage income matches the planners choice of
st in (3), once we recognize that D (st) = 1  st in the time-in-schoolmodel. Part (ii) of Proposition 2
then implies
_st = (1  st) K
 (1  ) :
On a BGP, schooling rises over time, but at a declining rate.
A dynastys intertemporal optimization also yields the same consumption and savings decisions as in
the planners problem. The family members adjust consumption in response to the real interest rate, t,
according to
_ct
ct
=
1

(t   ) .
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When combined with the intertemporal budget constraint and the no-arbitrage condition19, t = Rt=pt+
gp   , where pt = 1=qt is the equilibrium price of a unit of capital, this Euler equation generates the
same time path for aggregate capital as in the planners allocation; see the appendix for details.
Of course, it is no surprise that the market equilibrium with perfect competition and complete markets
mimics the planners solution. The point we wish to emphasize is that the time-in-school model converges
to a BGP and that the wage schedule ! (s; rt) gives the family members the appropriate incentives to
extend their time in school from one generation to the next. Here, the faster accumulation of e¤ective
capital relative to e¤ective labor sets in motion a sequence of events that preserves balance. An increase
in e¤ective capital lowers the rental rate. This causes the returns to education to rise, due to the
complementarity between schooling and capital. With KL < 1, the direct e¤ect of the capital deepening
is a fall in the capital share. But, since as we have noted Assumption 1 implies that we can write
Yt = ~F
h
AtKt (1  st)a ; BtLt (1  st) b
i
with a =  (1  ) and b = , schooling e¤ectively augments
the productivity of labor while diminishing that of capital. This in turn raises the capital share. While
it is fairly natural that the accumulation of e¤ective capital and the gains in education should have
opposing e¤ects on the capital share, the functional-form restrictions of Assumption 1 ensure that the
scale is perfectly balanced and the capital share is constant and equal to (   1) = (  1).
3.3 Balanced Growth in a Manager-WorkerModel
In Section 3.2, we described an environment in which individuals choose their time in school and education
improves productivity. In that model, rms allocate capital equipment to individual workers and output
is the sum of all that is produced by the various individuals. The model yields the same trade-o¤ between
education and labor supply that was captured in reduced form in the planners problem of Section 3.1.
In this section, we present an entirely di¤erent model that yields a similar reduced form. Now we
imagine teams that combine managersand production workers.Firms allocate capital equipment to
teams according to their productivity. Only production workers are directly responsible for operating
equipment and thus for generating output. But the productivity of a team depends on its ratio of
managers to workers, as in the hierarchical models of management proposed by Beckmann (1977), Rosen
(1982) and others.
The family structure, demographics, and preferences are the same as before. Lifespans are short.
Each individual decides whether to devote a xed fraction m of her potential working life to school. If
19The no-arbitrage condition states that the real interest rate on a short-term bond equals the dividend rate on a unit of
physical capital plus the rate of capital gain on capital equipment (positive or negative), minus depreciation.
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she opts to do so, she will acquire the skills needed to serve as a manager and she will have 1 m units
of time left to perform this function. Those who do not go for management training are employed as
production workers. They will use all of their available time to earn unskilled wages.
Let Lt be the time units supplied by production workers at time t and let Mt be the time units
supplied by managers. Since production workers devote all of their time to their jobs, Lt is also the
number of production workers. Managers are in school a fraction m of their time, so the number of
managers is Mt= (1 m). The population divides between workers and managers, so
Lt +
Mt
1 m = Nt . (8)
We take st = Mt=Lt to be our index of schooling. This is the ratio of managerial hours to hours of
production workers and the inverse of the typical managers span of control.It measures, for example,
the time that a manager can spend monitoring a typical one of her underlings. With this denition, (8)
implies Lt + Ltst= (1 m) = Nt, so D (s) = [1 + s= (1 m)] 1 is the share of production workers in the
total population.
Monitoring makes the workers and their equipment more productive. In particular, we suppose
that the production function at time t can be written as ~F
h
D (s)(1 )AtK;D (s)  BtL
i
, with ~F ()
homogeneous of degree one in its two arguments. With s =M=L, this implies that output is a constant-
returns to scale function of the three inputs, AtK;BtL and BtM . It also implies that the intensive
production function f (k; s) has the form D (s)  h [kD (s)]. An example of a production function with
this form is
Y = (BtL)
1  (AtK)  +D (s) (BtL)    .
In this model, the education decision for the representative individual born at time t is simple: pursue
schooling if (1 m)WMt > WLt and not if the inequality runs in the opposite direction, where WMt and
WLt are the market wages of managers and production workers at time t, respectively. In an equilibrium
with a positive number of managers, every individual must be indi¤erent between the two occupations,
so that
(1 m)WMt =WLt . (9)
Over time, the accumulation of e¤ective capital exerts upward pressure on the skill premium, because the
functional form of Assumption 1 ensures that capital is more complementary with managers than it is
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with production workers. This provides the incentive for a greater fraction of the new generation to gain
skills and then the expanding relative supply of managers to workers restores the indi¤erence condition,
(9).
In the appendix, we use WMt = ~FM
n
[1 + st= (1 m)] (1 )AtKt; [1 + st= (1 m)] BtLt
o
and
WLt = ~FL
n
[1 + st= (1 m)] (1 )AtKt; [1 + st= (1 m)] BtLt
o
to show that (9) implies
Eh
"
kt

1 +
st
1 m
 #
=
   1
  1 .
This gives the same index of schooling as in the planners solution (3). It follows that the economy
converges to a BGP, with a constant rate of output growth and a constant capital share given by parts
(i) and (iii) of Proposition 2, respectively, and with an ever increasing ratio of manager hours to worker
hours.
3.4 Balanced Growth with Directed Technical Change
In this subsection, we describe briey how the short-lifespans model can be extended to incorporate
endogenous innovation and directed technical change. We follow closely the approach developed by Ace-
moglu (2003). In his model, nal goods are assembled from two intermediate goods, each of which is
produced from sets of upstream, di¤erentiated varieties. One set of varieties is produced by capital alone,
the other set by labor alone. Innovation takes the form of the invention of new varieties of one type of
upstream intermediate or the other. Expansion in a set of upstream intermediates augments the produc-
tivity for assembling the associated downstream intermediate. A xed stock of scientists conducts R&D.
If they choose to invent new varieties of capital intermediates, then the resulting innovation generates
capital-augmenting technology gains in the aggregate production function. If they invent new varieties
of labor intermedates, then the innovation appears as labor-augmenting in the aggregate production
function.
To extend our reduced-form model of Section 3.1 to incorporate directed technical change in the
manner of Acemoglu (2003), let one type of intermediate be produced by Lt and the other by Kt, where
Lt = D (st)Nt, as before. Each downstream intermediate good is a CES aggregate of the quantities used
of the upstream di¤erentiated intermediates. Then At reects the measure of capital varieties available at
time t and Bt reects the measure of labor varieties; each is a power function of the measure of varieties,
where the exponent is a function of the elasticity of substitution between the upstream goods. The
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aggregate production function, expressed as a function of BtLt and AtKt, obeys Assumption 1 as before.
Now recall the indirect production functionthat we derived in (4). This indirect production function
results when the planner chooses st to maximize aggregate output, Yt. After substituting for Lt in
the aggregate production function and using the optimal D (st) prescribed by (3), it is a function of
the technology-augmented population size, BtNt, and the technology-augmented capital stock, AtKt.
Moreover, it is a Cobb-Douglas function of these two quantities. But, as Acemoglu has already shown,
when the aggregate production function is Cobb-Douglas, there is a unique long-run equilibrium with
balanced growth in which both capital-augmenting and labor-augmenting technological progress take
place at well-determined rates. Moreover the growth rates of both types of intermediates will be positive
if there is enough curvature in the trade-o¤ between the two types of innovation. It follows that, in an
extended version of the short-lifespans model with directed technical change, long-run growth is balanced,
and the equilibrium is characterized by positive rates of both capital-augmenting and labor-augmenting
technological progress.20
3.5 Relationship to the Literature on Investment-Specic Technological Change
Before leaving this section, it may be useful to relate our results to the large literature that has studied
the long-run implications of investment-specic technological change. In his seminal paper on embodied
technical progress, Solow (1960) did not close his model to solve for a steady state, but he indicated how
this could be done. However, Solow employed a Cobb-Douglas production function throughout this paper,
and his discussion about closing the model relies on this assumption. Sheshinski (1967) demonstrated
convergence to a BGP in an extended version of the Johansen (1959) model with both embodied and
disembodied technological progress. Although he does not restrict attention to any particular production
function, he does insist that both forms of progress are Harrod-neutral, i.e., they augment the productivity
of labor. So, the technology gains in Sheshinskis paper, while embodied in vintages of capital, are
nonetheless assumed to be labor-augmenting. These ndings are echoed in Greenwood et al. (1997), who
resurrected the literature on technological improvements that are embodied in new equipment. They
20 In (4), the exponents on AtKt and BtNt are  = (   1) = (  1) and 1  , respectively. Borrowing the speccation
of innovation from Acemoglu (2003), we obtain _At=At = bA (SAt) and _Bt=Bt = bB (SBt), where SAt and SBt are the
number of scientists engaged in inventing capital-intensive varieties and labor-intensive varieties at time t, respectively. The
allocation satises the resource constraint, SAt+SBt = S, where S is the total supply of scientists. We assume that  (0) = 0
and that  () is concave. Since the planner can change the allocation of scientists at any moment in time without regard
to preferences, the path of population growth, or the path of capital accumulation, it is optimal to allocate the stock of
scientists so as to maximize the instantaneous rate of increase in total factor productivity, AtB
1 
t . The growth rate of TFP
is  _At=At+(1  ) _Bt=Bt = bA (SA)+(1  ) bb (sB). With su¢ cient concavity of  (), the solution converges to a BGP
with SA > 0 and SB > 0.
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studied an economy that has no opportunities for schooling in which two types of capital (equipment
and structures) and labor are combined to produce consumption goods. Unlike Sheshinski, they do
not assume that embodied progress is Harrod-neutral and, consequently, they are led to conclude that a
Cobb-Douglas production function is necessary to generate balanced growth, in keeping with the dictates
of the Uzawa Growth Theorem.
Krusell et al. (2000) posit a technology with capital-skill complementarity according to which output
is produced from equipment, structures and two types of labor (skilledand unskilled). Leaving aside
their distinction between equipment and structures, their model is one with capital and two types of
labor, much like our manager-worker model in Section 3.3 above. Although their production function
incorporates capital-skill complementarity, it does not satisfy the dictates of our Assumption 1. Nor
do they endogenously determine the supplies of skilled and unskilled workers. They, and much of the
substantial literature that has adopted their production function, do not address the prospects for bal-
anced growth with ongoing declines in investment-good prices and endogenous schooling, but instead
focus on the transition dynamics that result from a specied sequence of relative price changes and of
factor supplies. Two recent papers do try to generate balanced growth in models of investment-specic
technological progress that is not Harrod-neutral. He and Liu (2008) introduce endogenous schooling
into the Krusell et al. model, so that the relative supplies of skilled and unskilled labor are determined
in the general equilibrium. They dene a BGP to be an equilibrium trajectory along which equipment,
structures and output all grow at constant rates and the fraction of skilled workers converges to a con-
stant. With this denition, they conclude (see their Proposition 1) that balanced growth is consistent
with ongoing investment-specic technological change only when the aggregate production function takes
a Cobb-Douglas form. Maliar and Maliar (2011) study a similar environment, but assume instead that
the stocks of skilled and unskilled labor grow at constant and exogenous rates. They show that, with a
falling relative price of equipment, balanced growth requires technological regress in the component of
technical change that reects the productivity of capital, such that (in our notation) K = 0. In contrast
to these papers, we have shown that balanced growth is in fact compatible with a falling relative price of
capital, non-negative growth in capital productivity, and KL 6= 1, provided that capital and schooling
are su¢ ciently complementary. Our result requires that the aggregate production function falls into the
class dened by Assumption 1 and that an appropriate index of the economys educational outcome is
rising over time.
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4 Balanced Growth with Overlapping Generations
In Section 3, we illustrated how balanced growth could emerge in an economy with endogenous education.
But we did so in a model of short lifespans in which each cohort lives for an instant and is replaced by
the next without any overlap. In such a setting, it was possible to summarize the economys education
in a scalar variable and to allow that variable to jump from one moment to the next. This approach was
pedagogically convenient, because it laid bare the mechanism at work. But our treatment of schooling was
surely unrealistic, inasmuch as educational attainment typically varies by birth cohort and the distribution
of educational outcomes adjusts slowly over time.
In this section, we introduce overlapping generations. We enrich the time-in-schoolmodel of Section
3.2 by assuming that individuals live for a nite (but stochastic) time, the rst part of which they spend in
school. A representative member of a cohort chooses at birth the duration of her tenure in the classroom
and joins the labor force once her schooling is complete. We allow productivity to rise and then fall with
experience, thereby capturing the employment life cycle that ultimately leads to retirement. Our goal
once again is to uncover conditions that allow for a BGP with ongoing capital-augmenting technological
progress and falling investment-goods prices, and to study the properties of such a growth path. We will
nd, for example, that in the overlapping-generations (OLG) model, the capital share in national income
varies with the form and speed of technological change, unlike what we found to be true for an economy
with short lifespans, where the capital share is independent of K and L.
A potential obstacle to our constructing a balanced growth path in an OLG model is that, if younger
cohorts obtain more schooling and enter the workforce later in life than their more senior counterparts,
the age distribution of the employment pool will not be stationary over time. As we show below, it turns
out that the particular restriction on the production function that maintains balance between capital,
labor, and schooling the analogue to Assumption 1 leads naturally to an evolving age distribution in
the workforce that retains a simple structure, thereby preserving balance across cohorts and facilitating
aggregation.
As before, the economy is populated by a unit mass of identical dynasties.21 A representative dynasty
comprises a continuum Nt of individuals at time t. Each individual gives birth to a new member of her
dynasty with an instantaneous probability  and faces an instantaneous probability  of death. These
21For continuity with the previous section and comparability with the literature, we continue to assume that families
maximize dynastic utility, including the discounted well-being of unborn generations. We could obtain similar results,
including the existence of a BGP, in a Yaari (1965) economy with (negative) life insurance and no bequests by following the
path laid out by Blanchard and Fischer (1989, ch.3).
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hazard rates remain constant over time. Therefore, the size of a dynasty is given by
Nt = e
( )(t t0)Nt0 ;
and the size at time t of the surviving cohort born at b is Nbe (t b). The population growth rate is
n =   .
Conditional on survival, there are three phases of life: schooling, work, and retirement. An individual
obtains s years of schooling, has a working life of u years after leaving school, and then retires. Let u be a
workers labor-market experience. We assume that a rm that employs K units of capital and L workers
with schooling s and experience u produces output F (AK;BL; s; u), where F (AK;BL; s; u) = 0 for u 
u. Thus, workers with experience beyond u cease to be productive and exit the labor market. The wage
rate of an individual with schooling s and experience u at time t isWt(s; u). There is disembodied capital-
augmenting technical change at rate gA, labor-augmenting technical change at rate L, and investment-
specic technical change at rate gq. The goods-market clearing condition Ct + It=qt = Yt and the capital
accumulation equation _Kt = It   Kt remain as before.
We assume that individuals must obtain their education at the beginning of their lives.22 Each
individual designs a stopping rule,i.e., a duration s that she intends to remain in school conditional on
survival. These choices are made to maximize the expected present discounted value of lifetime earnings,
because that is optimal for the dynasty as a whole.23 For an individual born at time b, expected discounted
wage earnings at birth are given by
Z 1
b+s
e 
R t
b zdze (t b)Wt (s; t  b  s) dt =
Z u
0
e 
R b+s+u
b zdze (s+u)Wb+s+u (s; u) du , (10)
where we have used the fact that an individual born at b who obtains s years of schooling has labor market
experience u = t  s  b at time t. Let sb be the optimal schooling duration chosen by an individual born
at b. Then a person born at b starts to work at time b+sb and retires at time b+sb+ u. On the balanced
growth path, educational attainment rises over time, so that the entry date b + sb is strictly increasing
in b. We denote by () =    s() the birth date of an individual who enters the workforce at time  .
At time t0 a representative dynasty chooses a future path of consumption fct  0g1t0 to maximize
22Blinder and Weiss (1976) have shown that models of life-cycle human-capital investments typically admit cycling with
stretches in and out of school, unless the discount rate is su¢ ciently high or su¢ ciently low. Of course, the data show that
most individuals concentrate their formal education at the beginning of life. To avoid the complications of (unrealistic)
cycling, we assume that the education technology requires an uninterrupted period of schooling.
23Considering the continuum of family members, a dynasty faces no uncertainty. So its members can self-insure and
behave as if risk-neutral with respect to investment decisions.
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dynastic utility,
Z 1
t0
e (t t0)Nt
c1 t   1
1   dt ,
subject to the budget constraint
Z 1
t0
e
  R tt0 zdzNtctdt = pt0Kt0 +
Z 1
t0
e
  R tt0 zdz Z (t)
(t u)
Nbe
 (t b)Wt(sb; t  b  sb)dbdt:
On the right-hand side of the budget constraint, we have the value of the dynastys capital at time t0
plus, for all future periods t, the discounted (to time t0) present value of wage income of all surviving
dynasty members who remain employed at time t.
The solution to the dynastys intertemporal maximization problem yields the Euler equation, _ct=ct =
(t   ) =, as usual. Moreover, by di¤erentiating the budget constraint, we again obtain the no-arbitrage
equation t = Rt=pt + gp   , from which it follows that

_ct
ct
=
Rt
pt
+ gp      , (11)
much as is true in the model with short lifespans.
Let us revisit the problem facing rms, before returning to the individualsschooling choices. Much
is the same as before. The main di¤erence is that a rm may hire workers from di¤erent cohorts who
vary in their schooling and experience. Firms must decide how much capital to allocate to each of their
workers. However, with constant returns to scale and competitive rms that earn zero prots, it is as
if each worker type indexed by s and u is hired by a separate rm, or by a separate unit of the rm.
At time t, a rm that employs workers with schooling s and experience u  u maximizes prots by
choosing the number L of such workers and the capital K with which to equip them so as to maximize
F (AtK;BtL; s; u)   RtK  Wt (s; u)L, where Wt (s; u) is the competitive wage earned at time t by a
worker with schooling s and experience u. The rst-order conditions imply, as before,
rt = fk [ (s; u; rt) ; s; u] ;
and
! (s; u; rt) = f [ (s; u; rt) ; s; u]  rt (s; u; rt)
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for all workers fs; ug that are present in the workforce at time t, where f (k; s; u)  F (AtK=BtL; 1; s; u)
is the intensive production function, rt = Rt=At is the rental rate per e¤ective unit of capital,  (s; u; rt) is
the e¤ective capital to e¤ective labor ratio that the rm applies to workers of type fs; ug when the rental
rate per e¤ective unit of capital is rt, and ! (s; u; rt) is the wage per e¤ective unit of labor for workers of
this type. In equilibrium, the wage schedule at time t satises Wt(s; u)=Bt  wt(s; u) = !(s; u; rt) and
the sum total of the equipment allocated to all workers exhausts the available supply of capital, or
Kt =
Bt
At
Z (t)
(t u)
Nbe
 (t b)(sb; t  sb   b; rt)db:
Despite being two dimensional, the wage schedule for e¤ective labor wt(s; u) changes over time only due
to changes in rt, which implicitly determines how much e¤ective capital is allocated to a worker with
schooling s and experience u.
To generate a BGP, we need a functional-form assumption and parameter restrictions that are anal-
ogous to Assumptions 1, 2, and 3 for the model with short lifespans. Now we adopt
Assumption 4 The intensive production function can be written as f (k; s; u) = esh (ke s; u), with
 > 0 and  2 (0; 1), where
(i) h (z; u) is strictly increasing, twice di¤erentiable, and strictly concave in z  ke s for all z > 0 and
0  u < u and h(z; u) = 0 for all u  u; and
(ii) f(k; s; u) is log supermodular in k and s for all u 2 [0; u).
An example of a function that satises Assumption 4(i) and (ii) is h (z; u) = ~h (u) (1 + z ) =, where
 > 0 and ~h (u) is rst increasing and subsequently decreasing in u for 0  u < u and zero for u 
u. This generates an aggregate production function of the form F (AK;BL; s; u) = ~h (u) (BL)1  
(AK)  + (esBL) 
 =
.
Recall that Assumption 1 implies KL < 1 in the model with short lifespans. By the same token
(and by an analogous argument), Assumption 4 implies KL < 1 when u < u in the OLG model. Now
dene Eh;z(z; u) to be the elasticity of h(z; u) with respect to z  ke s. Assumption 4 implies that
Eh;z(z; u) is strictly decreasing in z when u < u, in analogy to what came before. Moreover, the elasticity
Eh;z (z; u) equals the capital share in revenue at a rm (or unit) that employs workers with schooling s
and experience u. To ensure that output is non-decreasing in schooling, we must have Eh;z (z; u)  .
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Now dene dmax(u) = limz!0 Eh;z(z; u) and dmin(u) = limz!1 Eh;z(z; u). Let dmax = inf0u<u dmax(u)
and dmin = sup0u<u dmin(u).24 We impose the following parameter restrictions.
Assumption 5 (i)   sup0u<u dmax(u); (ii) dmin1 dmin < 
 < dmax1 dmax (iii) (1  ) > K ; and (iv)
 
(1 ) > 
, where 
  1(1 ) K
n
n  + (1  )L + (   )
h
1  K(1 )
io
.
Part (i) guarantees that output is non-decreasing in schooling. Part (ii) provides for optimal schooling
that is positive and nite. Part (iii) will be required for educational attainment to rise over time. Finally,
part (iv) is analogous to Assumption 3 in the model with short lifespans inasmuch as it ensures that the
integrals in the dynastys budget constraint are nite.25 Note that since dmin < dmax  , parts (ii) and
(iv) of Assumption 5 together imply that  > .
We return to the choice of schooling. Let us conjecture the existence of a BGP along which output,
aggregate consumption, and the capital stock grow at constant rates. On a BGP, the goods-market
clearing condition implies as in Lemma 1 that aggregate consumption (as well as the value of the
capital stock) must grow at the same rate as output. Then the dynastys intertemporal optimization
requires a constant real interest rate,
 =  (gY   n) + 
and the no-arbitrage condition t = Rt=pt+gp   then implies that rt declines at constant rate gA gp =
gA + gq = K . Using this observation, we show in the appendix that, along a BGP, choosing sb to
maximize the expected present discounted value of wages by the cohort born at b is equivalent to a
maximization problem involving the choice of xb  rbe[(1 ) K ]s. Moreover, the latter maximization
problem is independent of the birthdate b. We prove that the problem has a unique solution, x, provided
(as we ultimately must assume) that the second-order condition is satised. It follows that sb and rb are
tied together along any BGP by
x = rbe[(1 ) K ]sb for all b. (12)
Now di¤erentiate the relationship between rb and sb, and use the fact that, on a BGP, rb falls at rate
24Whenever h(z; u) is log separable in z and u, Eh;z() is independent of u. Then dmin(u) and dmax(u) are constants.
Moreover, when h (z; u) = hu (u)
 
1 + z 
 =
, dmin = 0 and dmax = .
25Part (iv) can alternatively be written as
 > n+ (1  )

L +
   
(1  )K

,
which is closer in form to what appears in Assumption 3.
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K . Then schooling by birth cohort must evolve according to
_sb =
K
(1  )  K
; (13)
that is, educational attainment rises linearly over time.26 This prediction of the model seems roughly
in accord with the U.S. experiences (as depicted in Figure 2) for the birth cohorts from 1876 until
approximately 1955, and then again for the later cohorts, albeit with schooling then growing more slowly
than before.
We take a momentary detour to comment on the role played by retirement in our model. Recall
that productivity falls to zero after experience reaches u, at which point a surviving individual leaves
the workforce. We will see shortly that u has no e¤ect on the steady-state growth rate. We introduced
the assumption that productivity falls to zero in order to counteract an implication of the (common but
clearly unrealistic) assumption that death occurs with a constant hazard rate. Given the evolution of
educational attainment dictated by (13), there must have been some birth cohorts in the distant past for
whom the non-negativity constraint that s  0 was binding. With a constant probability of death, some
members of these ancient cohorts must still be alive at time t. Indeed, without retirement, there would
be a mass of workers at every moment with schooling s = 0. The presence of such individuals in the
labor force would complicate aggregation in the model. It seems best to assume that individuals must
eventually leave the workforce given the assumption (made for convenience) that individuals might live
unreasonably long lives.
Our next task is to calculate aggregate output, Yt. Dene the function  (z; u) as the inverse of
hz (z; u), so that z   [hz (z; u) ; u]. Then  (s; u; r) = es

re(1 )s; u

. At time t, a worker with
schooling s and experience u uses Bt (s; u; rt) = Btes

rte
(1 )s; u

units of e¤ective capital and pro-
duces Btesh



rte
(1 )s; u

; u
	
units of output. Only individuals born at times b between (t  u)
and (t) are employed at time t. Since rt declines at rate K and schooling evolves according to (13), it
follows that at time t an individual born at b 2 [ (t  u) ;(t)] with experience u = t  b  sb, produces
a ow Btesbh f [e Kux; u] ; ug of output.
An individual with experience u at time t was born at (t   u) and has t   u   (t   u) years of
schooling. Therefore, using (13) to relate the schooling of individuals born at (t   u) to the schooling
26Assumption 5(iii) ensures that _sb > 0. To see the parallel with the short lifespan model, (12) could be written instead
as x = rte(1 )s(t) , thereby relating a cohorts schooling to the cost of e¤ective capital upon entry into the workforce.
Similarly, we could rewrite (13) as d

s(t)

=dt = K= (1  ), measuring the rate of increase in the schooling among those
just entering the workforce.
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of those born at (t0), we have
s(t u) = t  u (t  u) = t0  (t0) +
K
(1  ) (t  t0   u) . (14)
Since the size at time t of the cohort born at b is Nbe (t b) = e( )(b t0)Nt0e (t b), the number of
workers with experience u at time t is Lt (u) = Nt0e
 t0e (t t0)e(t u) = Nte[(t u) t] and using
(14) gives
Lt (u) = Nte
[(t0) t0]e 
K
(1 ) (t t0)e 
h
1  K
(1 )
i
u
. (15)
Combining these observations, aggregate output at time t is given by
Yt = Bt
Z u
0
Lt (u) e
s(t u)h



e Kux; u

; u
	
du .
Since x = rt ue(1 )s(t u) = rteKue(1 )s(t u) , aggregate output at t is
Yt = Bt
Z u
0
Lt (u) r
  
1 
t

e Kux
 
1  h



e Kux; u

; u
	
du . (16)
Using (16), we can readily calculate the growth rate of output on a BGP, which is27
gY = n+ L +
   
(1  )K . (17)
Note the similarity between (17) and gY in part (ii) of Proposition 2, except that the progeneration
rate  enters the former but does not exist as a separate parameter in the model with short lifespans.
Note too that Assumption 5(ii) and (iv) imply  > , as we have observed previously, so the growth
rate again is increasing in both the rate of labor-augmenting technological progress and the total rate of
capital-augmenting technological progress.28
How do factor shares evolve along the BGP that we have just described? Recall that an individual
27 In performing this calculation, we use Lt (u) = e
h
n  K
(1 )
i
(t t0)Lt0 (u), Bt = e
L(t t0)Bt0 , and rt = e
 K(t t0)rt0 .
28The transversality condition on the BGP requires  > gY , which in turn requires
   
(1  ) > 
 ;
where we recall that

  1
(1  )  K

n  + (1  )L + (   )

1  K
(1  )

.
This condition has been assumed to hold in part (iv) of Assumption 5.
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with schooling s and experience u works at time t with Btes

rte
(1 )s; u

e¤ective units of capital.
This equals Btes(t u) [e Kux; u] for individuals who are still in the workforce at time t, given that
schooling evolves according to (13) and rt declines at rate K . Then, since the schooling level of a worker
with experience u at time t is given by (14) and there are Lt(u) such individuals in the labor force, it
follows from the capital-market clearing condition that
Kt =
Bt
At
Z u
0
Lt (u) e
s(t u)

e Kux; u

du .
Now, using rt = RtAt and x
 = rteKue(1 )s(t u) , capital income amounts to
RtKt = rtBt
Z u
0
Lt (u) r
  1
1 
t

e Kux
 1
1  

e Kux; u

du . (18)
Thus, on the balanced growth path, aggregate capital income grows at the same rate gY as aggregate
output, which implies that the capital (and labor) share is constant. Combining (15), (16), and (18)
yields
K =
R u
0 e
 
h
+  
(1 )K
i
u
e Kux [e Kux; u] duR u
0 e
 
h
+  
(1 )K
i
u
h f [e Kux; u] ; ug du
: (19)
We are ready to summarize our main ndings for the model with overlapping generations. We have
Proposition 3 Suppose that Assumptions 4 and 5 hold in the model with overlapping generations. Then
the OLG economy has a unique balanced growth path. On the BGP,
(i) aggregate output, aggregate consumption, and aggregate wages grow at rate
gY = n+ L +
   
(1  )K ;
(ii) the educational attainment of new cohorts rises according to
_sb =
K
(1  )  K
;
(iii) the aggregate capital share is constant.
Before leaving this section, we o¤er several further observations about the BGP in the OLG model.
First, since at time t there are Lt (u) workers with experience u, (15) implies that the time t labor force
is
30
Lt = Nte
[(t0) t0]e 
K
(1 ) (t t0)
Z u
0
e
 
h
1  K
(1 )
i
u
du ,
so that the labor force participation rate is
Lt
Nt
= e[(t0) t0]e 
K
(1 ) (t t0)
Z u
0
e
 
h
1  K
(1 )
i
u
du .
It follows that, on the BGP, the participation rate declines at a constant rate K= (1  ). That is,
as time devoted to school rises over time, a smaller fraction of the population works. The FRED data
(Series LNS11300001) show that labor force participation among men has been declining steadily in the
United States since the start of the series in 1948.
Second, the fraction of workers with less than u years of experience at time t is
R u
0 Lt (z) dz
Lt
=
R u
0 e
 
h
1  K
(1 )
i
z
dzR u
0 e
 
h
1  K
(1 )
i
z
dz
.
This fraction is constant over time. In other words, the distribution of experience among those in the
labor force does not vary along the BGP. There are, however, shifts in the distribution of schooling in the
labor force. At time t the fraction of workers with experience below u also equals the fraction of workers
with at least t0   (t0) + K(1 ) (t  t0   u) years of schooling. Therefore, the schooling of workers at
all levels of experience increases by K= (1  ) per year. Consequently, the entire density of schooling
shifts to the right at this constant rate.
We can also calculate the returns to schooling and the returns to experience along the BGP. We nd29
@ logWt(s; u)
@s
=    (1  ) Eh;z



rte
(1 )s; u

; u
	
1  Eh;z



rte(1 )s; u

; u
	
and
@ logWt(s; u)
@u
=
hu
 


rte
(1 )s; u

; u

h
 


rte(1 )s; u

; u
 1
1  Eh;z



rte(1 )s; u

; u
	 .
In the cross-section, log wages increase with educational attainment (holding experience constant), albeit
at a declining rate. This is reminiscent of a Mincer wage equation (Mincer, 1974), except that Mincer
posited a linear relationship between log wages and years of schooling. Over time, the returns to schooling
29We use ! (s; u; r) = es
n
h


h
re(1 )s; u
i
; u

  re(1 )s
h
re(1 )s; u
io
.
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rise as rt declines, for workers with a given s and u. Finally, if h (z; u) is log separable in z and u, then the
returns to experience holding u constant are increasing in s, while the returns to experience conditional
on s and u fall over time.
Finally, we turn to the determinants of the long-run capital share. Unfortunately, the expression
in (19) does not provide a simple and transparent relationship between K and the rates of technical
progress, in large part because the economy is populated by individuals with di¤erent levels of schooling
and varied experience who therefore work with di¤erent amounts of capital. To illustrate how changes in
technological progress impact the capital share and the wage prole, we resort to numerical simulation
of a parameterized version of the model.
For the simulation exercise, we use the production function
F (AtK;BtL; s; u) = ~h(u) (BtL)
1  AtK  + (esBtL)  = for u < u,
which, as we discussed above, corresponds to h(z; u) = ~h(u) [1 + z ] =. We adopt a simple, quadratic
experience prole, ~h(u) = 1 + 0:2

1  (2u=u  1)2 and specify a working life of u = 40 years. We set
the birth and death rates equal to  =  = 0:01. For each calibration, we choose the production function
parameters , , and , so that in the baseline case (K = 0:02 and L = 0:01) the capital share is 0:35,
the average local elasticity of substitution between capital and labor is 0:6, and educational attainment
increases by one year each decade.
We will nd that the sensitivity of the capital share to changes in technological progress is governed
by the real interest rate. For this reason, we must choose the intertemporal elasticity of substitution and
the discount rate with care. What interest rate should we target? On the one hand, the low riskless rate
of return in the U.S. economy over many decades suggest that we ought to choose parameters to match
a low value of . On the other hand, our model features equality on the margin between the internal
rate of return on schooling and the discount rate. But rates of return on schooling have been high in
the United States and elsewhere, which suggests choosing parameters that yield a higher value for . It
is impossible to choose parameters that simultaneously match the low riskless rate and the high rate of
return on schooling.30 Instead of taking a strong stand on the appropriate interest rate for our model,
we present comparative statics under both low-interest-rate and high-interest-rate scenarios.
Table 1 shows two sets of simulation results. In the top part of the table, which presents a scenario
30The gap may be explained by factors outside the model such as nancing constraints, risk compensation, or a utility
cost of schooling.
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Low Interest Rate:  = :01;  = 1
K L
Growth in
per capita Income
Annual Increase
in Schooling
Capital Share Interest Rate
0:03 0:01 0:028 0:158 0:348 0:038
0:02 0:01 0:022 0:1 0:35 0:032
0:01 0:01 0:016 0:048 0:352 0:026
0:02 0:02 0:032 0:1 0:35 0:042
0:02 0:01 0:022 0:1 0:35 0:032
0:02 0 0:012 0:1 0:35 0:022
High Interest Rate:  = :01;  = 3
K L
Growth in
per capita Income
Annual Increase
in Schooling
Capital Share Interest Rate
0:03 0:01 0:038 0:158 0:288 0:123
0:02 0:01 0:028 0:1 0:35 0:095
0:01 0:01 0:019 0:048 0:402 0:068
0:02 0:02 0:038 0:1 0:303 0:125
0:02 0:01 0:028 0:1 0:35 0:095
0:02 0 0:018 0:1 0:394 0:065
Table 1: Response of Long-Run Growth Rate, Schooling, Capital Share, and Interest Rate to Changes in
Rates of Technological Progress
with a baseline interest rate of 3.2% per year, a decrease in the rate of capital-augmenting or investment-
specic technical change of one percentage point per year reduces the output growth rate by a little
more than half a percentage point per year and reduces the rate of increase in educational attainment
by a half-year of schooling per decade. However, in this case, the capital share moves hardly at all. In
the bottom part of the table, which presents a scenario with a higher baseline rate of 9.5 percent per
year, a decline in K has a similar impact on output growth and on the rate of increase in educational
attainment, but the impact on the capital share is much more substantial.
What accounts for this di¤erence? The impact of a change in K on factor shares reects the respon-
siveness of schooling decisions to changes in the rate of technological progress. When the interest rate is
low, an individuals choice of schooling reects the allocation of e¤ective capital she anticipates through-
out her lifetime. As K falls, so does the allocation of e¤ective capital later in life, and this reduces
the optimal time in school. The relatively elastic response of schooling cushions the impact of capital
deepening on the factor shares, much as in the model with short lifespans, for which we found that K is
independent of K and L. Indeed, we show in the appendix that, in the OLG model, as the interest rate
approaches the growth rate of the economy from above, the capital share approaches (   ) = (  ),
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which also is independent of K and L. In contrast, if individuals discount future wages heavily, then
their educational decisions will largely reect their capital allocation and the state of technology shortly
after their time in school. The response of s to a change in K or L will be muted by the relative
disregard for capital and technology later in life. With a dampened response of schooling, the impact on
the capital share is greater. Interestingly, a slowdown in the rate of labor-augmenting technical change
has similar e¤ects on output growth and the capital share as a fall in the rate of capital-augmenting
technological progress in both cases.
5 Conclusion
Over at least the last half century, the United States has experienced balanced growth; nearly constant
growth rates of output per worker, capital, and consumption, and roughly constant factor shares until
quite recently. Uzawas Growth Theorem established that, in a conventional neoclassical growth model,
balanced growth can be realized only if technical change is purely labor-augmenting or the elasticity of
substitution between capital and labor is unity. But the price of capital equipment has been falling
precipitously over time and the elasticity of substitution appears to be signicantly less than one. We
have shown that if labor quantity and labor quality do not enter the aggregate production function
symmetrically, capital-augmenting technological change can be reconciled with balanced growth, provided
that schooling increases over time and that capital and schooling are su¢ ciently complementary. Our
model matches trends for the U.S. economy that suggest balance as well as others that may appear to
reect unbalanced growth, such as a linear increase in educational attainment and a falling labor-force
participation rate. We achieve this while also matching conventional estimates of the capital-labor
elasticity of substitution and life-cycle earnings proles.
The basic mechanism in our model is straightforward: over time, growing stocks of e¤ective capital
raise the returns to schooling, which induces individuals to spend more time in school. Inasmuch as capital
and labor are complements, capital accumulation tends to lower capitals share in national income, but this
is o¤set by the subsequent rise in schooling, because capital and schooling are also complements. When
capital and schooling are more complementary than capital and labor, the second e¤ect can neutralize
the rst. Although the presence of these o¤setting forces is natural enough, restrictions on how schooling
enters the production function are needed to maintain exact balance along an equilibrium trajectory.
The restrictions are in a sense analogous to those usually imposed on preferences in a dynamic model
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in order to generate balanced growth. Specically, while it may be natural to assume that income
and substitution e¤ects o¤set one another as wages rise, the intratemporal utility function must be
specied in a particular away so as to maintain perfect balance along an equilibrium trajectory. Just as
balanced-growth preferences are consistent with a range of intertemporal elasticities of substitution and
labor-supply elasticities, so too are the restrictions we impose on the production function consistent with
a range of elasticities of substitution between capital and labor and between capital and schooling.
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Appendix for Balanced Growth Despite Uzawa
by
Gene M. Grossman, Elhanan Helpman, Ezra Obereld and Thomas Sampson
Proofs from Section 2
Proof of Lemma 1
By assumption Ct < Yt. Therefore, the resource constraint Yt = Ct+It=qt ensures It > 0. The capital accumulation
equation is _Kt = It   Kt implying
gK =
_Kt
Kt
=
It
Kt
  :
On a BGP gK is constant meaning that since It > 0 the growth rates of I and K must be the same. Thus, gI = gK .
Di¤erentiating the resource constraint and rearranging gives
(gC   gY ) Ct
Yt
+ (gI   gq   gY ) It=qt
Yt
= 0:
Substituting for It=qtYt = 1  CtYt in this expression and using gI = gK we have
(gK   gq   gC) Ct
Yt
= gK   gq   gY :
If both sides of this expression equals zero we immediately obtain gY = gC = gK   gq as claimed in the lemma.
Otherwise, since the growth rates are constant on a BGP it must be that C and Y grow at the same rate implying
gY = gC . But then the resource constraint implies
It=qt
Yt
= 1   CtYt is constant and, since gI = gK , this ensures
gY = gK   gq. Therefore, the lemma holds.
Proof of Proposition 1
Since factors are paid their marginal products the capital share is K = AtKtFK (AtKt; BtLt; st) =Yt. Note also
that because F has constant returns to scale in its rst two arguments FK (AtKt; BtLt; st) = FK(kt; 1; st) where
1
kt = AtKt=BtLt. Therefore, on a BGP where the capital share is positive and constant we have31
0 =
_K
K
= gA + gK   gY + d logFK (kt; 1; st)
dt
= K +
d logFK (kt; 1; st)
dt
;
where the nal equality uses Lemma 1 and K = gA + gq.
Taking the derivative of FK and using kFKK + FKL = 0 we have
K =  
FKK _kt + FKs _st
FK
=
FLK
FK
_kt
kt
  FKs _st
FK
=
1
KL
FL
F
_kt
kt
  FKs _st
FK
:
Since 1  K = FL=F this can be rearranged to give
KLK = (1  K)
_kt
kt
  KLFKs _st
FK
: (20)
To simplify (20) it will be useful to derive an expression for FKs=FK . Note that
@ [Fs=FL]
@K
=
FKs
FL
  FLKFs
F 2L
=
FK
FL

FKs
FK
  1
KL
Fs
F

: (21)
Rearranging, we have FKsFK =
FL
FK
@[Fs=FL]
@K +
1
KL
Fs
F . Plugging this into (20) gives
KLK = (1  K)
_kt
kt
  KL FL
FK
@ [Fs=FL]
@K
_st   Fs _st
F
: (22)
Finally, di¤erentiating the production function Yt = F (AtKt; BtLt; st) yields
gY = K (gA + gK) + (1  K) (gB + gL) + Fs _st
F
;
= gA + gK   (1  K)
_kt
kt
+
Fs _st
F
:
Using Lemma 1 and K = gA + gq this implies
31 Instead of assuming constant factor shares, this expression can also be obtained by assuming the rental price of capital
Rt declines at rate gq. To see this di¤erentiate Rt = AtFK (kt; 1; st).
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K = (1  K)
_kt
kt
  Fs _st
F
:
Substituting this expression into (22) gives equation (1). This completes the proof.
Generalization of Proposition 1
Proposition 1 assumes technical change is factor augmenting, but we can generalize the proposition by relaxing
this restriction. Suppose the production function is Y = F^ (K;L; s; t) where technical change is captured by the
dependence of F^ on t. We can decompose technical change into a Harrod-neutral component and a non-Harrod-
neutral residual. Technical change is Harrod-neutral if, holding the capital-output ratio and schooling xed, it
does not a¤ect the marginal product of capital (Uzawa 1961). Therefore, we can dene the non-Harrod-neutral
component of technical change as the change in the marginal product of capital for a given capital-output ratio
and schooling.
Let ' be the capital-output ratio and dene ^ ('; s; t) by
' =
^ ('; s; t)
F^ (^ ('; s; t) ; 1; s; t)
:
^('; s; t) is the capital-labor ratio that ensures the capital-output ratio equals ' given s and t. Di¤erentiating this
expression with respect to t while holding s and ' constant and using K = ^F^K=F^ implies
^t
^
=
1
1  K
F^t
F^
: (23)
When technical change is Harrod-neutral ^t @@^ log F^K +
@
@t log F^K = 0. Thus, we dene the non-Harrod-neutral
component of technical change 	 by
	   KL

^t
@
@^
log F^K (^ ('; s; t) ; 1; s; t) +
@
@t
log F^K (^ ('; s; t) ; 1; s; t)

:
From this denition we have
3
	 =  KL
 
F^KK ^t
F^K
+
F^Kt
F^K
!
;
=  KL
 
F^KK
F^K
^
1  K
F^t
F^
+
F^Kt
F^K
!
;
=
F^t
F^
  KL F^Kt
F^K
; (24)
where the second line follows from (23) and the third line uses ^F^KK =  F^KL, the denition of KL and 1  K =
F^L=F^ . Note that in the case where technical change is factor augmenting we have F^ (K;L; s; t) = F (AtK;BtL; s)
which implies 	 = (1  KL)gA.
Using the expression for 	 given in (24) we obtain the following generalization of Proposition 1.
Proposition 4 Suppose the production function is Y = F^ (K;L; s; t) and that investment-specic technological
progress occurs at constant rate gq. If there exists a BGP along which the income shares of capital and labor are
constant and strictly positive when factors are paid their marginal products, then
(1  KL) gq +	 = KL F^L
F^K
@
h
F^s=F^L
i
@K
_s:
To avoid repetition, we omit the proof of Proposition 4 since it follows the same series of steps used to prove
Proposition 1. Suppose either s is constant as in Corollary 1 or the production function can be written in terms
of a measure of human capital H(L; s; t) implying
@[F^s=F^L]
@K = 0 as in Corollary 2. Then Proposition 4 implies that
a BGP with constant and strictly positive factor shares can exist only if 	 = 0 and either KL = 1 or gq = 0.
Thus, a BGP is possible only if technical change that a¤ects the production function is Harrod-neutral and either
the elasticity of substitution between capital and labor equals one or there is no investment-specic technological
change.
Proofs from Section 3
Implications of Assumption 1
f(k; s) is strictly log supermodular if and only if fksf > fkfs. Using Assumption 1 to compute these derivatives
it follows that f is strictly log supermodular if and only if Eh(z)  Eh0(z)  1 > 0 where Eh(z) = zh0 (z) =h (z) and
Eh0(z) = zh00 (z) =h0 (z). Now the elasticity of substitution KL between capital and labor is
4
KL =
 fk
kfkk

1  kfk
f

=
Eh [k(1  s)]  1
Eh0 [k(1  s)] : (25)
Concavity of h implies Eh0 < 0 meaning that KL < 1 if and only if Eh   Eh0   1 > 0 which, as observed above, is
equivalent to f being strictly log supermodular.
From the denition of the intensive-form production function in Assumption 1 we have
FKsF
FKFs
=
fksf
fkfs
=
   1  Eh0 [k(1  s)]
   Eh [k(1  s)] :
Substituting this expression and (25) into (21) gives
@ (Fs=FL)
@K
=
FKFs
FLF

   1  Eh0 [k(1  s)]
   Eh [k(1  s)]  
Eh0 [k(1  s)]
Eh [k(1  s)]  1

:
Therefore, @ (Fs=FL) =@K > 0 if and only if the marginal product of each input is positive and ( 1)(Eh Eh0 1) <
0. Since  < 1 this inequality holds if and only if f is strictly log supermodular.
Second Order Condition of the Planners Problem
The planner chooses st to maximize Yt. The rst order condition is
D0(st)D(st) 

  (  1)h

AtKt
BtNt
D (st)
 1

+ (  1)h0

AtKt
BtNt
D (st)
 1

AtKt
BtNt
D (st)
 1

= 0;
and the second order condition is
(  1)D(st) ( 1) 2 [D0(st)]2 AtKt
BtNt
f (   1)h0(z) + (  1)zh00(z) + (  1)h0(z)g < 0:
Using    1 = (  1)Eh(z) the second order condition holds if and only if
Eh(z)  Eh0(z)  1 > 0;
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which holds for any possible z if and only if f is strictly log supermodular.
Transition Dynamics of the Planners Problem
After solving for optimal schooling we can write the planners problem as
max
fctg
Z 1
t0
Nte
 (t t0) c
1 
t   1
1   dt
subject to
_Kt = qt [Y (Kt) Ntct]  Kt:
where Y (Kt) is given by (4).
Solving this problem we nd the planner chooses a consumption path that satises
_ct
ct
=  +  + gq

+
1

   1
  1 qt
Y (Kt)
Kt
: (26)
Now let ~Yt = e gY (t t0)Y (Kt), ~Ct = e gY (t t0)Ntct and ~Kt = e gK(t t0)Kt where gY is dened in part (i) of
Proposition 2 and gK = gY + gq. Using (26) and the capital accumulation equation together with the fact that qt,
At, Bt and Nt grow at constant rates gq, gA, L and n, respectively, we have
~Yt = ~Y

~Kt

= A
 1
 1
t0 (Bt0Nt0)
(1 )
 1 z
1 
 1 h (z) ~K
 1
 1
t ;
_~Ct =
"
 gY + n  +  + gq

+
qt0

   1
  1
~Y ( ~Kt)
~Kt
#
~Ct; (27)
_~Kt =  (gY + gq + ) ~Kt + qt0
h
~Y

~Kt

  ~Ct
i
: (28)
Since consumption and schooling can jump, Kt (or, equivalently ~Kt) is the economys only state variable. The pair
of di¤erential equations (27) and (28) govern the evolution of the economy from any initial condition Kt0 .
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Figure 3: Transitional dynamics and stability of the balanced growth path
Figure 3 depicts a familiar phase diagram. The vertical line labeled CC has ~K = ~K such that
~Y ( ~K)
~K
=
1
qt0
  1
   1 [ (gY   n) + +  + gq] :
From (27), we see that _~Ct = 0 along this line. The curve labeled KK has ~C = ~Y ( ~K)  (gY + gq + ) ~K=qt0 . This
curve, which from (28) depicts combinations of ~C and ~K such that _~Kt = 0, can be upward sloping (as drawn) or
hump-shaped. In either case, the two curves intersect on the upward sloping part of KK.32 The intersection gives
the unique steady-state values of ~K = ~K and ~C = ~C, which in turn identify the unique BGP. As is clear from
the gure, the BGP is reached by a unique equilibrium trajectory that is saddle-path stable.
Necessity of Functional Form
Consider an economy that satises the assumptions required for Lemma 1 to hold and has production function
F (K;L; s; t) which is constant returns to scale in its rst two arguments. Suppose factors are paid their marginal
products and schooling is chosen to satisfy
st = argmax
s
F (Kt; Lt; s; t) subject to Lt = D (s)Nt:
We assume this optimization problem has a unique interior maximum.
32To see this, note that ~Y 0

~Kt

=  1
 1
~Y ( ~Kt)
~Kt
. Consequently, the slope of the KK curve is  1
 1
~Y ( ~Kt)
~Kt
  gY +gq+
qt0
which
is positive when ~K = ~K by (3).
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Suppose the economy is on a BGP from time T onwards with constant and strictly positive factor shares. With
a slight abuse of notation dene ~F by
~F (K;L; s; t) = ~F
h
AtKD (s)
a
; BtLD (s)
 b
i
 F
h
AtKD (s)
a
; BtLD (s)
 b
; sT ;T
i
;
where b = 1 + aK= (1  K), while At and Bt are dened by
At  egY (t T )D(st) aKT
Kt
;
Bt  egY (t T )D(st)bLT
Lt
:
Since a and b jointly satisfy a single restriction, ~F denes a one dimensional family of functions.
Di¤erentiating the denitions of At and Bt together with the constraint Lt = D(st)Nt and using Lemma 1 we
obtain
K 
_At
At
+ gq = a(n  gL);
L 
_Bt
Bt
= gY   n  K
1  K K :
K is the total rate of capital-augmenting technical change, while L is the rate of labor-augmenting technical
change. When both n and the labor force growth rate gL are constant then K and L are also constant. Also,
provided schooling is increasing over time n > gL implying that a > 0 if and only if K is strictly positive.
We can now prove the following proposition. Part (i) shows that on the BGP F has a one dimensional family
of representations of the form ~F
h
AtKD (s)
a
; BtLD (s)
 b
i
. From the expressions for K and L above we see
that each member of this family has a di¤erent combination of capital-augmenting and labor-augmenting technical
change. When we say the production function can be represented by ~F we mean that the equilibrium allocation
on the BGP is the same under ~F as under F . However, this does not imply that counterfactual experiments
using ~F will necessarily coincide with counterfactuals under F . The rst order impact of some policy changes
(e.g., schooling subsidies, capital taxation) depends on KL and Ks  (FKFs)=(FKsF ). Therefore, in part (ii)
of the proposition we show that if KL is constant on the BGP then KL = ~KL  ( ~FK ~FL)=( ~FKL ~F ) and that
8
~Ks  ( ~FK ~Fs)=( ~FKs ~F ) can be written as a function of ~KL, a and b. Consequently, if KL and Ks are constant
on the BGP then there exist unique values of a and b such that ~KL = KL and ~Ks = Ks. Thus, knowing KL
and Ks is su¢ cient to separate the roles played by capital-augmenting and labor-augmenting technical change.
Moreover, when a and b are chosen appropriately counterfactual analysis using ~F instead of F will, to a rst order,
give accurate predictions.
Proposition 5 Suppose for all t  T the economys equilibrium trajectory fYt;Kt; Lt; stg is a BGP with constant
and strictly positive factor shares. On the BGP,
(i) The production function F can be represented by ~F in the sense that for all t  T
~F (Kt; Lt; st; t) = F (Kt; Lt; st; t) ;
~FK (Kt; Lt; st; t) = FK (Kt; Lt; st; t) ;
~FL (Kt; Lt; st; t) = FL (Kt; Lt; st; t) ;
~Fs (Kt; Lt; st; t) = Fs (Kt; Lt; st; t) ;
(ii) ~KL and ~Ks satisfy
1
~Ks
  1 = (a+ b)

1
~KL
  1

;
and if KL is constant then ~KL = KL.
Proof. Without loss of generality let T = 0. Output at t  0 is given by
F (Kt; Lt; st; t) = Yt = e
gY tY0 = e
gY tF (K0; L0; s0; 0) = F
 
egY tK0; e
gY tL0; s0; 0

;
= F

AtKtD (st)
a
; BtLtD (st)
 b
; s0; 0

;
= ~F (Kt; Lt; st; t) :
To show the marginal products of capital are equal, we use the facts that the capital share is constant over time
and capital is paid its marginal product. Therefore
9
KtFK (Kt; Lt; st; t)
Yt
= K =
K0FK (K0; L0; s0; 0)
Y0
=
egY tK0FK (e
gY tK0; e
gY tL0; s0; 0)
egY tY0
;
=
AtKtD (st)
a
FK

AtKtD (st)
a
; BtLtD (st)
 b
; s0; 0

Yt
;
=
Kt ~FK (Kt; Lt; st; t)
Yt
:
Dividing each side by Kt=Yt gives FK (Kt; Lt; st; t) = ~FK (Kt; Lt; st; t). Identical logic using the labor share gives
FL (Kt; Lt; st; t) = ~FL (Kt; Lt; st; t).
To complete the proof of part (i) we show equality of the marginal products of schooling. Optimal schooling
choice implies
D0 (st)Lt
D (st)
=   Fs (Kt; Lt; st; t)
FL (Kt; Lt; st; t)
:
This means the ratio of the marginal product of schooling to output can be written as
Fs (Kt; Lt; st; t)
Yt
=   (1  K) D
0 (st)
D (st)
:
We now show that same equation holds for ~F . Di¤erentiating ~F with respect to s and dividing by output gives
~Fs (Kt; Lt; st; t)
Yt
=
1
Yt
D0 (st)
D (st)
h
aAtKtD (st)
a
FK

AtKtD (st)
a
; BtLtD (s)
 b
; s0; 0

 bBtLtD (st) b FL

AtKtD (st)
a
; BtLtD (st)
 b
; s0; 0
i
;
= [aK   b (1  K)] D
0 (st)
D (st)
;
=  (1  K)D
0 (st)
D (st)
:
To prove part (ii) we start by noting that when KL is constant on the BGP, the homogeneity of F implies
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KL =
FK (K0; L0; s0; 0)FL (K0; L0; s0; 0)
FKL (K0; L0; s0; 0)F (K0; L0; s0; 0)
;
=
FK (e
gY tK0; e
gY tL0; s0; 0)FL (e
gY tK0; e
gY tL0; s0; 0)
FKL (egY tK0; egY tL0; s0; 0)F (egY tK0; egY tL0; s0; 0)
;
=
FK

AtKtD (st)
a
; BtLtD (st)
 b
; s0; 0

FL

AtKtD (st)
a
; BtLtD (st)
 b
; s0; 0

FKL

AtKtD (st)
a
; BtLtD (st)
 b
; s0; 0

F

AtKtD (st)
a
; BtLtD (st)
 b
; s0; 0
 ;
=
~FK (Kt; Lt; st; t) ~FL (Kt; Lt; st; t)
~FKL (Kt; Lt; st; t) ~F (Kt; Lt; st; t)
;
= ~KL:
Next dene h^(z)  F (z; 1; s0; 0). Then we have
~F (K;L; s; t) = BtLD(s)
 bh^

AtK
BtL
D(s)a+b

:
Noting the equivalence between this expression and the functional form assumed in Assumption 1 and using
reasoning analogous to that employed above to derive the implications of Assumption 1 we have
~KL =
Eh^
h
AtK
BtL
D(s)a+b
i
  1
Eh^0
h
AtK
BtL
D(s)a+b
i ;
~Ks =
b
a+b   Eh^
h
AtK
BtL
D(s)a+b
i
b
a+b   1  Eh^0
h
AtK
BtL
D(s)a+b
i :
On the BGP we also have
K =
Kt ~FK (Kt; Lt; st; t)
Yt
= Eh^

AtKt
BtLt
D(st)
a+b

:
Combining these expressions and using b = 1 + aK= (1  K) we have that on the BGP
1
~Ks
  1 = (a+ b)

1
~KL
  1

:
11
This completes the proof.
Transition Dynamics in the Time-in-SchoolModel
Start by observing that combining rt = Rt=At with the no arbitrage condition t = Rt=pt + gp    and pt = 1=qt
gives
rt =
1
qtAt
(t + gq + ) : (29)
Individualsoptimal schooling choices imply (st; rt)(1  st) = z for all t  t0 where z takes the same value
as in the planners problem. Therefore, aggregate output is given by (4) as in the planners problem.
Using the functional form assumption imposed on f , the rst order condition for prot maximization (5) yields
rt = (1  st)(1 )h0(z):
Substituting this expression into the capital market clearing condition kt = (st; rt) and using (29) shows the real
interest rate satises
t =  gq    + qtA
 1
 1
t

BtNt
Kt
z
(1 )
 1
h0(z):
Combining this equation with the representative dynastys Euler equation _ct=ct = (t   )= and using Eh(z) =
(   1)=(  1) and (4) gives
_ct
ct
=  +  + gq

+
1

   1
  1 qt
Y (Kt)
Kt
:
Noting that this equation is identical to equation (26) we see that consumption per capita satises the same
di¤erential equation as in the planners problem. Since the capital accumulation equation is also the same in both
cases we conclude that consumption and the aggregate capital stock follow the same equilibrium trajectory as in
the planners problem.
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Schooling Choice in the Manager-WorkerModel
Recall that the production function can be written as ~F

AtKD(s)
(1 ); BtLD(s) 

= BtLD(s)
 h [kD(s)]
where s =M=L and D(s) = [1 + s=(1 m)] 1. Since WMt = ~FM and WLt = ~FL, di¤erentiating yields
WMt = BtD(st)
 D
0(st)
D(st)
h [ktD(st)
] f  + Eh [ktD(st)]g ;
WLt = BtD(st)
 h [ktD(st)]

1  Eh [ktD(st)] + stD
0(st)
D(st)
f   Eh [ktD(st)]g

:
Substituting these expressions into (9) and using D0(s) =  D(s)2=(1 m) implies that, in equilibrium,
Eh
"
kt

1 +
st
1 m
 #
=
   1
  1 :
The fact that Eh(z) is declining in z ensures stability of the equilibrium.
Proofs from Section 4
Derivation of Equation (12)
The function (z; u) is dened as the inverse of hz(z; u) so that z =  [hz(z; u); u]. Using Assumption 4 and the
denition of , the rst-order conditions from prot maximization imply
 (s; u; r) = es
h
re(1 )s; u
i
;
! (s; u; r) = es
n
h


h
re(1 )s; u
i
; u

  re(1 )s
h
re(1 )s; u
io
:
Therefore, the wage at time b + s + u of an individual born at b who has s years of schooling and u years of
experience is
Wb+s+u (s; u) = Bb+s+ue
s
n
h


h
rb+s+ue
(1 )s; u
i
; u

  rb+s+ue(1 )s
h
rb+s+ue
(1 )s; u
io
:
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Since Bt grows at rate L and on a BGP rt declines at rate K it follows that along a BGP the wage function can
be written as
Wb+s+u (s; u) = Bbe
L(s+u)es

h
 


e Kuxb; u

; u
  e Kuxb e Kuxb; u	 ;
where xb  rbe[(1 ) K ]s.
Now consider the optimal choice of schooling. From substituting the wage equation above into (10) it follows
that maximizing the expected present discounted value of lifetime earnings is equivalent to choosing xb to maximize
v (xb) where
v (xb) = x
 
b
Z u
0
e (+ L)u

h
 


e Kuxb; u

; u
  e Kuxb e Kuxb; u	 du; (30)
and
  L +      
(1  )  K
: (31)
Note that this maximization problem is independent of time of birth b. Therefore, the solution is the same for
every cohort.
Di¤erentiating (30) yields
v0 (xb) = ( + 1)x
  1
b
Z u
0
e (+ L)uh
 


e Kuxb; u

; u
  
 + 1
  Eh;z
 


e Kuxb; u

; u

du;
and
v00(xb) = (   1)v
0(xb)
xb
+ ( + 1)x  1b
Z u
0
e (++K L)uz

e Kuxb; u
 
e Kuxb
 
 + 1
  Eh;z
 


e Kuxb; u

; u
  h   e Kuxb; u ; u @Eh;z ( [e Kuxb; u] ; u)
@z

du:
We assume that if the rst order condition v0(xb) = 0 has a solution x then the second order condition v00(x) < 0
14
holds. Since v0(xb) is continuous it follows that if a solution to the rst order condition exists, this solution is
unique and maximizes v(xb).
Substituting  = (gY   n) +  and (17) into (31) shows that on a balanced growth path
 =
1
(1  )  K

n  + (1  )L + (   )

1  K
(1  )

= 
;
where 
 is dened in Assumption 5. Consequently, part (ii) of Assumption 5 implies dmin <  =( + 1) < dmax.
Since h(z; u) is strictly concave in z we must have z(z; u) < 0. Recalling the denitions of dmin and dmax
it then follows that   +1 > Eh;z ( [e Kuxb; u] ; u) for all u 2 [0; u) when xb is chosen su¢ ciently small and
 
 +1 < Eh;z ( [e Kuxb; u] ; u) for all u 2 [0; u) when xb is chosen su¢ ciently large. Therefore, continuity of v0(xb)
guarantees the rst order condition has a solution. This solution x satises (12) for all b.
Capital Share
The capital share, K , is given by (19). Using the rst order condition v0(x) = 0 we can rewrite this equation
as
K =
 
 + 1
R u
0
e ( gY )ue 
h
+
( )K
(1 )
i
u
h f [e Kux; u] ; ug duR u
0
e ( gY )ue 
h
+
( )K
(1 )
i
u
x [e Kux; u] du
R u
0
e
 
h
+
( )K
(1 )
i
u
x [e Kux; u] duR u
0
e
 
h
+
( )K
(1 )
i
u
h f [e Kux; u] ; ug du
;
where  is given by (31). Finally, taking the limit as   gY converges to zero from above, we have
lim
 gY&0
K = lim
 gY&0
 
 + 1
=
   
   :
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